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FTC v. Lundbeck: Is
anything in antitrust
obvious, like, ever?
BY CHRIS SAGERS* AND RICHARD M. BRUNELL**
In FTC v. Lundbeck, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a bench verdict
finding a merger to monopoly, followed by a 1400% price increase,
not only legal, but effectively not even subject to antitrust. The result
followed from the district court's view that peculiarities in the
market for hospital-administered drugs rendered it essentially
immune from price competition. That being the case, the court found
that even products very plainly substitutable on any traditional
"functional interchangeability" analysis are not in the same "relevant
market" for purposes of rules governing horizontal mergers. We
think the court's analysis was incorrect for a number of factual
reasons, but stress that, much more importantly, a case like Lundbeck
calls for return to traditionally broad, prophylactic rules.
KEY WORDS: Lundbeck, merger, pharmaceuticals, market definition
* James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law, Cleveland State
University, and Senior Fellow, American Antitrust Institute.
** General Counsel, American Antitrust Institute.
AUTHORS' NOTE: We submitted a brief amicus curiae in the Eighth Circuit in
Lundbeck on behalf of the American Antitrust Institute, urging reversal in favor of
plaintiff Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed here are our own and do not
represent the views of the American Antitrust Institute.
@ 2014 by Federal Legal Publications, Inc.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.
-Commonly attributed to William of Ockham'
Just how elaborate or counterintuitive must one's defense of seem-
ingly anticonsumer conduct become before its complexity suggests
that one is on the wrong track?
Many people thought things like that about Federal Trade Commis-
sion v. Lundbeck, Inc.,2 a 2010 consummated merger challenge that the
Federal Trade Commission (the FTC or the Commission) lost on
bench verdict and failed to overturn before the Eighth Circuit. Surely
the Commission asked such questions. The deal-which combined
Indocin IV and NeoProfen, the only two drugs to treat a potentially
life threatening condition in infants-was a merger to monopoly over
a product with a highly inelastic demand, and the merger was fol-
lowed by price increases of nearly 1400%. One rather suspects John
Sherman had such cases in mind. And so, among lawyers, journalists,
and other observers, there was some serious head-scratching when
the Commission not only failed to get the unequivocally slam-dunk
win that many thought it had coming, but lost.'
I See William of Ockham, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
("entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity"), available at http:/ /plato
.stanford.edu /entries/ ockham /.
2 FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., No. 08-6379, 2010 WL 3810015 (D. Minn. Aug.
31, 2010), aff'd, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011).
The Chairman made a minor cause celebre of these dramatic facts. See, e.g.,
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Leibowitz, FTC v. Ovation Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., No. 081 0156 (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http:/ /www.ftc.gov/sites
/ default/ files / documents / cases / 2008 / 12 / 081216ovationleibowitzstmt.pdf.
("Ovation's profiteering on the backs of critically ill premature babies is not
only immoral, it is illegal. Ovation's behavior is a stark reminder of why
America desperately needs health care reform and why vigorous antitrust
enforcement is as relevant today as it was when the agency was created
almost one hundred years ago in 1914.").
4 See Jenna Greene, FTC Loses an Easy One, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 27, 2010. See also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers With Dominant Firms: The Lundbeck Case, COMPE-
TITION POL'Y INT'L, Dec. 13, 2011; Steven C. Salop, Merger Settlement and Enforce-
ment Policy for Optimal Deterrence and Maximum Welfare, 81 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2647,
2664 n.48 (2013) (Lundbeck was an "inexplicable market definition error.").
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In the end, this case was fairly bizarre all around and not just
because seemingly drastic antisocial conduct went unremedied. How-
ever, while we definitely will spend some time considering the facts
and legal specifics, we want to say up front that to us further bicker-
ing over details is not what really matters. Most important to us,
Lundbeck is the kind of case showing why antitrust sometimes needs
simple rules. It shows why antitrust ordinarily reserves a rule of effec-
tively per se illegality for monopoly-preserving mergers' and why
such a rule should have been followed.
But, given the symposium topic, we'll also suggest some more
technical reasons why the approach to market definition in Lundbeck
was so bad. For one thing, to an overwhelming new degree, the court
put the market definition cart before the horse of any actual policy
goal. It had been a consensus in antitrust that market definition is not
an end in itself, but only one means to identify situations of poten-
tially harmful conduct.'
For another thing, in purporting to define this market, the court
appeared to apply rules of law that we thought were radical and dan-
gerous. Clearly implied by the court was the view that if a market seems
like it already lacks price competitiveness, then a plaintiff cannot show
relevant injury. The court believed that because of institutional peculiari-
ties affecting the market for hospital-administered drugs, the degree of
5 See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw T 701d
(3d ed. 2008) (monopolist's "acquisition of any firm that has the economic
capabilities for entry and is a more-than-fanciful possible entrant is presump-
tively anticompetitive"); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576
(1966) (monopolist's acquisition was illegal where it "eliminated any possibil-
ity of an outbreak of competition that might have occurred").
6 See United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 453 (1964) ( "Inter-
changeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand are not to be used to
obscure competition but to 'recognize competition where, in fact, competition
exists."' (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962)));
United States v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 866 F.2d 242, 246 (8th Cir. 1988)
(same); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE AND FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (market definition
"is not an end in itself, but is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger's
likely competitive effects"); cf. Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124
HARv. L. REv. 437, 443 (2010).
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price constraint that even closely substitutable drugs can impose on
each other is muted. Only implicit was its corollary view that if the
acquisition did not alter prices, then it did no harm. Implicitly, then, the
court seemed to hold that if a market seems to be already uncompeti-
tive, then antitrust law does not apply to it. We think that is unprecedented
and contrary to existing policy. The court also seemed to imply, contrary
to black letter law, that quality competition is irrelevant in antitrust. And
finally, the court was just dead wrong that there was no substitutability
based on price. Its own findings elaborately demonstrate it.
Admittedly, Lundbeck is really just one unpublished trial court deci-
sion, affirmed only on standard of review grounds, and it was widely
thought to be incorrect. But we think it matters. Litigated merger cases
are so rare that they all matter. Moreover, the narrow facts of Lundbeck
will recur. Lundbeck actually acquired the drugs through its predeces-
sor, Ovation Pharmaceuticals, a firm that can be likened not unfairly to
a patent troll.' There just happens to be another such firm trying to pull
off a similar deal at the moment (involving a 56,000% price increase),"
7 Ovation developed no drugs of its own. It was a private equity vehi-
cle designed to acquire underpriced drugs, which it then produced through
agreements with other manufacturers. See GTCR LLC, Ovation Pharmaceuti-
cals: Finding Healthy Profits in Health Care, http:/ /www.gtcr.com/our-
focus / healthcare / leadership-stories / ovation-pharmaceuticals-inc / (last
visited Apr. 28, 2014).
8 A U.S. firm called Questcor exists solely to own one drug, Synacthen,
which it did not develop and which is the only approved drug of its kind in
the United States. Since acquiring it in 2001, Questcor increased its price from
$40 to $28,000. In mid-2013, Questcor acquired a second drug that is not yet
approved in the United States, but is indicated for the same uses overseas. A
separate rival to purchase that drug has sued Questcor, claiming it would
have sold Synacthen in the United States for "a few hundred dollars a vial,"
see Complaint, Retrophin, Inc. v. Questcor Pharms., Inc., No. 8:14-CV-00026-
JLS-JPR (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2014), and market analysts report that the FTC is
investigating as well. See Questcor/Synacthen: Antitrust, Political Analysis
Reveals Significant Risk That FTC Will Investigate U.S. Patent Rights Acquisition;
Likelihood of Challenge to Turn on Competitive Landscape of Long Release ACTH
Drugs, CAPITOL FORUM, Aug. 1, 2013. See also Letter from Amy Klobuchar, U.S.
Senate, to Edith Ramirez, Chair, Federal Trade Commission (Aug. 1, 2013),
available at http:/ /www.citronresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12
/QCOR-Sen-Klobuchar-Letter-to-FTC-8-1-2013.pdf; Citron Research, Questcor
(NASD:QCOR): A Single Digit Stock in 18 Months or Less, and Here's Why (July
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and who knows how many others there may be. The court's reasoning
also poses some broad competitive risks in the pharmaceutical sector.
Hospital-administered drugs are apparently all or mostly purchased in
the same way, so it is not clear why any would be subject to Clayton
Act section 7. That seems pretty radical. And finally, the even bigger
and grimmer reason to care about a case like Lundbeck is what it says
about the state of antitrust generally. That a court (and commentators9)
could look at a monopolist's acquisition of its only rival, in a deal
delivering no social benefit whatsoever, and hold not only that it is not
illegal, but not even subject to antitrust, suggests that many courts can
no longer imagine an antitrust defendant ever losing.
We begin with a brief recounting of the facts, emphasizing those
that made Lundbeck seem easy to us. We then discuss two particular
problems in the court's market definition that we think were mis-
taken-the apparent view that quality competition is irrelevant, and
the disregard for evidence of actual price competition. But we con-
clude with a point that, again, really ought to trump any further nit-
picking over facts or economic theory. Even if there might be some
conceivable model under which this acquisition didn't make anything
any worse, we have to ask: Why shouldn't a monopolist's acquisition
of its next closest competitor, not even arguably producing any social
benefit, just be illegal, period?
II. THE FACTS, AS THEY LOOKED TO US
Indocin IV and NeoProfen-the drugs in question-are not identi-
cal,'o but they are the only FDA-approved drug remedies for a heart
condition in premature infants known as patent ductus arteriosus
10, 2011) (setting out rather striking background history of the Questcor busi-
ness model).
9 At least two papers have so argued, one by Kent Bernard in this sym-
posium and one by Greg Werden. See Kent Bernard, When the Price Isn't
Right-The Lundbeck Case and the A Path to Analyze Competition in Drug
Research and Development, in this issue of The Antitrust Bulletin; Gregory J.
Werden, The Economics of FTC v. Lundbeck: Why Drug Mergers May Not Raise
Prices, 9 J. COMPETMON L. & ECON. 89 (2012).
10 The drugs are not bio-equivalent-while they treat the same condi-
tion, they are actually different chemical compounds. FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc.,
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(PDA)." As PDA treatments they are equally effective,12 and at least at
the time of trial there was no consensus that either was preferred." By
then, a majority of hospitals carried one but not both, with the bulk of
those single-drug hospitals still preferring Indocin.1 In any event, the
No. 08-6379, 2010 WL 3810015, at *3 (finding of fact 18) (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010),
aff'd, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011). The findings of fact contained in the court's
opinion will be referred to, by paragraph number, as FE Also, the drugs are mar-
keted under FDA labels that differ slightly. Compare FF 15 with FF 16. They also
appear to differ in some ways in safety and side effects-specifically, Indocin has
some impact on urine output and renal function and affects blood flow to the
brain and gastrointestinal tract (FF 101)--and Indocin, unlike NeoProfen, can be
used to treat a separate condition involving brain hemorrhaging (FF 15).
A lot has been made of these facts, even though there was very little evidence
at the time of trial that doctors thought the differences mattered. See infra note
13. In any case, one might have thought they shouldn't matter all that much,
since it is elementary that products can be in the same product market without
being perfect substitutes. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
(Cellophane), 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) (antitrust does not "require that products
be fungible to be considered in the relevant market"). But see FF 116 (virtually
the court's only fact finding directly on point, finding that "NeoProfen and
Indocin IV are distinct; their side effects differ"); Bernard, supra note 9 (citing to
purportedly distinguishing features, and arguing that "[a]ttempting to treat
these products as fungible widgets . .. was an invitation to disaster.").
1 FF 14.
12 FF 21 (so finding, on the basis of "[plublished clinical studies").
13 The court heard some expert testimony that the purported safety dif-
ferences were either irrelevant, see FF 101 (differences "clinically insignifi-
cant"), FF 103 (neonatologist saw no "real advantages or differences"), or
very minor, FF 102 (neonatologist comfortable with either drug for "vast
majority" of patients), FF 105 (neonatologist comfortable with either drug if
NeoProfen were unavailable). The lack of any clear demonstration of NeoPro-
fen's purported safety benefits, and concerns about safety risks of its own,
frustrated much of Lundbeck's marketing plan for the drug, as it had
intended to differentiate it as the safer, superior alternative as soon as Indocin
faced challenge from a generic competitor. As late as 2008-two years into the
differentiation effort-Lundbeck's internal documents indicated that NeoPro-
fen's poor sales were still explained by the company's failure to persuade
hospitals that it was safer than Indocin. FF 83-84. See also Lundbeck, 650 F.3d at
1240 (characterizing the evidence below as showing that "It]he neonatolo-
gists' preferences differed (some prescribe Indocin IV, others NeoProfen)").
14 By 2009, fifty-one percent of hospitals purchased Indocin, another forty-
two purchased both drugs, and five percent purchased only NeoProfen. FF 94.
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two drugs are challenged only by a disfavored, last-resort surgical
alternative." Lundbeck's predecessor, Ovation, the pharmaceutical troll,
bought Indocin IV from Merck in 2005, pretty clearly with the design of
exploiting a big pocket of previously untapped market power.6 It cor-
rectly predicted that the initial purchase of Indocin would be profitable,
despite its lack of patent protection, because getting a generic drug into
production takes a while. In fact, it was much more profitable than pre-
dicted." And it then discovered a way to extend the payday by shortly
thereafter acquiring NeoProfen,8 a drug that was even more promising
is PDA can also be corrected by surgery, but surgery is a less desired
alternative. See FF 11, 12 (finding surgery to be only a "second-line" or "res-
cue" treatment of PDA and significantly more expensive than drugs).
16 Specifically, the court quoted from a Lundbeck executive's analysis
prepared in advance of the initial acquisition, who recommended it as "a
group of medically niche small volume products that don't have substitutes
and that are significantly under priced to the market. In the U.S. we can price
these almost anywhere we want given the product profiles." FF 43. As men-
tioned, shortly after the acquisition of NeoProfen Lundbeck increased the
price of Indocin by about 1400%. Lundbeck also raised the prices of the four
other drugs it initially acquired from Merck, by 257%, 864%, 979%, and
3437%, respectively. FF 57. The district court accepted Lundbeck's contention
that it would have jacked up Indocin's prices even if it hadn't acquired Neo-
Profen. FF 58.
" As the court found, Ovation's internal documents laid out precisely
this strategy. FF 80 (quoting a December, 2005, Lundbeck presentation to its
controlling shareholder, in which it defended the plan to acquire both Indocin
IV and NeoProfen) ("Our volume and sales projections for Indocin IV in the
original Merck acquisition model contemplated a rapid but short-lived
increase in Indocin IV sales, followed by rapidly decreasing sales over the
next five years due to new competitive threats, including generic entry and
[NeoProfen]."). As it happened, things went much better than that for Lund-
beck-for technological reasons. Bedford Laboratories, the only manufacturer
attempting to introduce indomethacin, the generic version of Indocin IV, was
not able to bring a product to market until February 2010, more than four
years after Lundbeck's initial price increase. See FF 57 (Lundbeck's initial
price increase of Indocin IV was in January, 2006), and FF 66 (Bedford Labora-
tories' generic indomethacin first offered for sale in February 2010).
18 Ovation learned that Abbott was seeking FDA approval for NeoPro-
fen less than two months before it acquired Indocin IV, and immediately after
the acquisition Ovation contacted Abbott to negotiate either an acquisition of
NeoProfen or an agreement to market the two drugs collaboratively. FF 33.
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because it still enjoyed intellectual property protection." As long as
Lundbeck's strategy to differentiate the two drugs was successful, Neo-
Profen could be a profitable purchase, even though it too would face
some competition from generic Indocin. To us, this all seemed pretty
open and shut. You benefit from a substantial period of high profits,
well-protected from your only two competitive threats-generic entry,
which requires a fairly long lag-time, and a therapeutic substitute
nearly ready for entry but which conveniently you've bought. You then
protect the substitute through a differentiation strategy, so that once
generics enter and take share from your first product, you still profit
from the other. Not only would this be a rational strategy, it's what the
defendant's internal documents said it was going to do.
The strangest thing about this strange case was that the court
found for the defendant only after it adopted much of the findings of
fact proposed by the plaintiff.20 That surprising result was driven by its
view of the institutional peculiarities of hospital drug purchasing,
1 NeoProfen enjoys patent protection until 2021, FF 16, and special
"orphan drug" protection, giving its owner special, exclusive marketing
rights until 2013. FF 17.
20 As a result, the court's ultimate judgment conflicted seriously with its
own fact finding, and, as we argued, this should have mattered on appeal. See
United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 447-58 (1964) (reversing judgment
as matter of law because trial court's own findings of fact did not support its
market definition); FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053-55 (8th
Cir. 1999) (reversing preliminary injunction because trial court's own findings
of fact conflicted with its market definition); see also Morgenstern v. Wilson, 29
F.3d 1291, 1295-97 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing permanent injunction in jury trial,
where market definition was based on expert opinion but "indisputable record
facts contradict or otherwise render the opinion unreasonable").
The appellate panel, however, thought it was just a fact case, despite its log-
ical conflicts, and so affirmed solely on the standard of review. FTC v. Lund-
beck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1243 (8th Cir. 2011)(affirming, because the question
"[w]hether this court would come to the same conclusion" would be "irrele-
vant."). One member of the panel, a district judge from Nebraska sitting by
designation, threw the FTC the bone of a concurrence finding the approach to
market definition "*perplexing," "odd," inappropriately based on testimony of
doctors who "had no responsibility to pay for the drugs or otherwise concern
themselves with cost," and "especially strange" in light of evidence that "(1)
both drugs are effective . . . and (2) internal records from the defendant raise
an odor of predation." Id. at 1243 (Kopf, J., concurring). Nevertheless, like his
colleagues, Judge Kopf felt that "the standard of review carries the day." Id.
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which it based on the testimony of several doctors and pharmacists to
the effect that they don't consider cost when deciding which drug to
use." We'll come back to that below.22
Another strange thing was the court's explanation of the purpose
and method of its "market definition." The two kinds of evidence usu-
ally used to exclude substitutes from a relevant market-evidence dis-
proving functional interchangeability and cross-price elasticity-were
unavailable here. The evidence showed that the drugs were inter-
changeable for antitrust purposes. They were equally effective, and
while some doctors and pharmacists expressed preferences, several
also expressed indifference or a preference for Indocin only because of
its longer track record.' And you literally can't measure cross-price
elasticity between two products that are offered at the same, unchang-
ing price, especially where they are sold by the same monopolist.24 The
only directly relevant evidence, of a kind normally not even admissible,
was the speculation of one economic consultant hired by the defense.?
III. CONTINENTAL CAN AND LUNDBECK CANNOT BOTH
BE THE LAW
Wholly apart from any price effects, Lundbeck's acquisition of
NeoProfen caused consumer losses by way of restrained quality com-
petition. That fact was demonstrated in the court's findings but ren-
dered legally irrelevant by its insistence on cross-price elasticity.
"Lundbeck stopped actively promoting Indocin IV," the court found,
and "instructed its sales representatives to focus on Indocin IV's weak-
nesses relative to NeoProfen's anticipated benefits."26 This reduction
and skewing of information was a clear loss to hospitals, doctors, and
patients, and harmed the competitive process." Had Lundbeck not
21 See FF 94-108.
22 See infra part IV.
23 See supra note 13.
24 See infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
26 FF 81.
27 Contrary to the contention of some commentators that price competition
was the only issue in the case, Werden, supra note 9, at 95, the FTC did argue
nonprice effects in the district court. See Post Trial Brief of Plaintiffs at 14, FTC v.
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acquired NeoProfen, it would have had the incentive not only to pro-
mote Indocin IV's benefits and to challenge the claims made for Neo-
Profen, but also to fund research to aid the effort.2 8 Moreover, a
separate owner of either of the drugs would strive to respond to
quality competition with technological innovation and quality
improvements. Lundbeck implicitly rejected these values as having
any relevance to antitrust at all, by way of its insistence on "cross-
price elasticity,"2 9 and that was an error of textbook law." The
Lundbeck, Inc., No. 08-6379 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2010), 2010 WL 1229950; see also
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 16, 32, 49, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236
(8th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3458), 2010 WL 5558180 (arguing that district court erro-
neously ignored nonprice competition). To be sure, the issue was not central to the
FTC's case, presumably because it did not support the FTC's efforts to obtain dis-
gorgement, and the courts did not address the relevance of nonprice competition.
28 Lundbeck suggested that it had no incentive to invest in efforts to pro-
mote Indocin IV because it expected rapid entry of generic indomethacin. See
Defendant Lundbeck Inc.'s Reply to Plaintiffs' Post Trial Br. at 38-39, FTC v.
Lundbeck, Inc., No. 08-6379 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2010), 2010 WL 2061874; see
also Bernard, supra note 9. However, the anticipation of generic entry would
not reduce returns to promotional investments to zero. Indeed, even after a
drug goes generic, it is not always the case that investment in the drug by the
brand falls to zero.
29 FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., No. 08-6379, 2010 WL 3810015, at *19-21 (D.
Minn. Aug. 31, 2010); see also FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir.
2011) (citing H.J., Inc. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531 (8th Cir. 1989) for
the proposition that "cross-price elasticity is essential to market definition").
3 It is well settled that restraints on quality or other nonprice competition
may be unlawful and sometimes are summarily condemned. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind.
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,459-60 (1986) ("refusal to compete with respect to
the package of services offered to customers, no less than a refusal to compete
with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the ability of the market
to advance social welfare"); 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 6, §
1 ("Enhanced market power can also be manifested in non-price terms and con-
ditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced product quality,
reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation. Such non-
price effects may coexist with price effects, or can arise in their absence."); id. §
4.1.2 (noting that the focus on "small but significant and non-transitory" price
changes, "is used because normally it is possible to quantify [such changes,] not
because price effects are more important than non-price effects."); id. § 4 (demand
substitution considers whether customers will substitute away from one product
to another "in response to a price increase or a corresponding non-price change,
such as a reduction in product quality or service").
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Supreme Court's leading decision on point, United States v. Continen-
tal Can,31 found that glass and metal containers were in the same rele-
vant market, despite a lack of cross-price elasticity. The district
court's finding of separate markets, said the Continental Can majority,
"employed an unduly narrow construction of the 'competition' pro-
tected by § 7."132 Lack of price effects is "relevant . . . but not determi-
native,"33 because while rivalry on quality terms "may not be price
competitionL] ... it is nevertheless meaningful competition between
interchangeable containers."' It is competition "of the type and qual-
ity deserving of § 7 protection and therefore the basis for defining a
relevant product market."3 In short, Continental Can makes clear that
because the antitrust laws protect nonprice competition as well as
price competition, functionally interchangeable economic substitutes
can be in the same relevant market even when consumers are not
price sensitive.3 1
378 U.S. 441 (1964).
32 Id. at 452.
3 Id. at 455; see also id. at 450 (noting that "a particular user . . does not
shift back and forth from day to day as price and other factors might make
desirable").
3 Id. at 456.
35 Id. at 449; see also, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045,
1054 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The district court placed an inordinate emphasis on
price competition without considering the impact of a corresponding reduc-
tion in quality.").
36 See Petition for Rehearing en Banc of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 11, FTC
v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1240 (8th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-3458) ("'the outer
boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable inter-
changeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product
itself and substitutes for it"' (quoting Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (emphasis added by FTC))). Of course, reasonable
interchangeability of use is not always an appropriate metric, and drugs that
are therapeutic substitutes may be in separate product markets in a merger
combining a brand drug with its generic substitute. As the Supreme Court
explained in Continental Can, "Since the purpose of delineating a line of com-
merce is to provide an adequate basis for measuring the effects of a given
acquisition, its contours must, as nearly as possible, conform to competitive
reality." 378 U.S. at 457.
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Lundbeck's most perverse consequence is that it is precisely those
markets lacking price competition that need nonprice rivalry the most.
Moreover, to the extent that Lundbeck is taken to require a showing of
significant cross-price elasticity in order for two products to be in the
same relevant market, it has potentially far-reaching consequences in
other markets where competition primarily occurs on nonprice attrib-
utes, including a fair portion of the health care sector and consumer
markets for free Internet or media services. Indeed, a cross-price elas-
ticity requirement may not only immunize mergers in price-insensitive
markets, but the logic would seem to allow naked horizontal restraints
(such as market allocation agreements) in such markets on the ground
that the conspirators are not horizontal competitors at all because their
products are not in the same relevant market.
IV. OH, AND BY THE WAY, ARE WE REALLY SO SURE THERE
WAS NO PRICE COMPETITION? SERIOUSLY?
But let us assume, contrary to theory, evidence, and law, that non-
price competition is irrelevant. Here, the proof still showed pretty
overwhelmingly that these drugs would constrain one another's
prices. First, a serious problem was the court's method for testing
cross-price elasticity, in that the facts chosen to test it really just can't
be used as they were here. But that is all fairly academic in compari-
son to the second problem, which was that the court's own findings
overwhelmingly showed that these two drugs actually were price-
competitive, in a way protected by antitrust.
A. Methodology: The trial court's "test" of cross-price elasticity
Lundbeck is a living testament that the plural of anecdote is not
data. Admittedly, it rested on the testimony of a large absolute number
of people, as these things go, and that fact seemed important to the
court. Specifically, thirteen people-seven doctors," four pharmacists,'
3 FF 102-08.
38 FF 96, 97, 99, 100. The court also heard from the chair of the Depart-
ment of Pharmaceutical Care and Health Systems at the University of Min-
nesota who said hospitals do care about prices and that hospitals could use
purchasing decisions to force prices down. Without explanation, the court
rejected that testimony as "unpersuasive." FF 95.
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and two economists"-essentially said that prices didn't really mat-
ter. But even aside from general doubts as to forward-looking con-
sumer testimony,40 the fact that the court relied on customer
witnesses who don't actually pay for the products, and the fact that
they were not asked the right questions," there was a serious prob-
lem in the inference the court drew from their testimony. A court
relying on a small sample of customer opinion discovers no more
than the earth-shattering fact that some consumers are inframarginal.
It takes only some marginal consumers to make price competition
work. In fact, real-world markets are common in which large num-
bers of consumers are inframarginal to the profit-maximizing price of
a differentiated good. That is to say, in any market except a highly
competitive one, it would not be uncommon for a defendant to find
that plenty of its customers would not switch away from the prod-
uct, even if price were raised above the monopoly price. 42 Most
antitrust courts understand this fact.3
3 FF 95, 115.
4 See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 9 538b (arguing that for-
ward-looking consumer testimony generally should be disfavored in market
definition); Sean P. Gates, Is the Customer Never Right? Bazaarvoice and Cus-
tomer Testimony in Merger Litigation, ANTITRUST, Spring 2014, at 61 (discussing
evolving case law concerning customer testimony).
41 Even assuming, as the court stressed, that no doctors would be
swayed by a twenty percent discount, see FF 97, 104, 105, 106, 108, some
might well switch if the price were reduced by thirty percent, or if, for exam-
ple, Indocin IV jumped from $108.88 to $1500 (as it did), and NeoProfen had
been priced at $450-$500 (at which Abbott had originally intended to sell it,
see FF 61). Moreover, the question some of these witnesses answered was
whether they would prescribe a less safe drug, whereas it had not been shown
at all that NeoProfen was less safe. See supra note 13.
As Hovenkamp observes, in any product-differentiated market, espe-
cially where price-cost margins are already high (as they were here), it will be
common for many inframarginal consumers to have willingness-to-pay above
monopoly price. Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 2 & n.10.
4 See United States v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir.
1997) ("[I]t is possible for only a few customers who switch to alternatives to
make [a] price increase unprofitable, thereby protecting a larger number of
customers who would have acquiesced in higher ... prices.").
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The court's finding also depended in part on the informal opinion
of one economic consultant,4 who opined on elasticity during his live testi-
mony' but admitted that he had done no statistical or econometric analysis of
any evidence." He was nonetheless willing to answer that elasticity was "very
low." Aside from the fact that other courts have held that kind of speculation
not even admissible,o an actual estimate would have been impossible. In its
technical sense, cross-price elasticity is estimated in antitrust litigation by sta-
tistical analysis of price changes over time, requiring data on the behavior of
the two products when the price of one of them changes. 9 But given their lack
of price variation, such a procedure would have been impossible in
FF 115. Even though the court found as a fact that cross-price elasticity
is "very low," FF 116, the court may have meant to imply that its ultimate
finding rested merely on plaintiffs' burden of proof. According to the court,
plaintiffs' economic expert did not offer an opinion as to cross-elasticity. FF
114; cf. FF 111. Yet, in its denial of Lundbeck's motion for summary judgment,
the district court recognized that even the total absence of cross-elasticity evi-
dence does not preclude a finding in favor of plaintiffs' proposed market. FTC
v. Lundbeck, Inc., No. 08-6379, 2009 WL 2215006, at *2 n.2 (D. Minn., July 21,
2009). Moreover, if the failure of proof were the court's rationale, it would be
error because, as we will explain, it would be literally impossible in this case
for either party accurately to estimate cross-elasticity.
45 FF 115.
4 According to the court, the expert "did not calculate a specific cross-
price elasticity between NeoProfen and Indocin IV, [but] he testified that that
it is very low." Id. Even on Lundbeck's characterization of his testimony, the
most he did was speculate on the basis of his perception of an institutional
market failure. Defendant's Post Trial Brief at 4-5, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., No.
08-6379 (D. Minn. Feb. 19, 2010), 2010 WL 2061873.
4 See, e.g., McLaughlin Equip. Co. v. Servaas, No. 98-127, 2004 WL
1629603, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 18, 2004) ("It is insufficient for an expert to merely
mention cross-elasticity of demand or supply; an analysis is required.").
48 Economists define cross-price elasticity as the percentage change in
the quantity demanded for a product associated with each one-percent
change in the price of another product. See 2B AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, Supra
note 5, at 1 507a.
4 See AM. BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF ANTITRUST L., ECONOMETRICS: LEGAL,
PRACTICAL, AND TECHNICAL ISSUES 269-309 (2005); Andrew M. Rosenfeld, The
Use of Economics in Antitrust Litigation and Counseling, 1986 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 49, 63-67.
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Lundbeck.0 Moreover, during the entire short period of their "compe-
tition," NeoProfen and Indocin IV were both owned by the same
monopolist.
The elasticity finding in Lundbeck, in other words, was the Cello-
phane fallacy on steroids. Just as high cross price elasticity at monop-
oly prices is irrelevant," seeming lack of it between two products
sold by the same monopolist is as well.52 (And, we should recall,
under black letter law monopolists should enjoy no inferences from
facts in their own control.") Indeed, if the benchmark price for
Indocin were the monopoly price, as Lundbeck claimed, then stan-
" There was no variation in price during the entire time that both prod-
ucts were available. Prior to July 2006, only Indocin IV was available, and by
that time Lundbeck had already raised its price to $1500 per three-vial course
of treatment. FF 57. When Lundbeck introduced NeoProfen in July 2006, it
offered the drug at $1450 per three-vial course of treatment (raising it to
$1552.50 about one year later). FF 62. As some courts have understood, cross-
elasticity cannot be measured without price variation. See Nobody in Particu-
lar Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1082
(D. Colo. 2004).
51 See AM. BAR ASS'N, SECT. OF ANTITRUST L., MARKET POWER HANDBOOK
59-60 (2005) (describing the Cellophane fallacy); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 471 (1992) ("The existence of signifi-
cant substitution in the event of further price increases or even at the current
price does not tell us whether the defendant already exercises significant mar-
ket power.").
52 It is elementary that the significance of price elasticity evidence
depends on the benchmark price against which it is measured, as well as the
price of substitute products. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 6; Steven
C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak and Antitrust at the
Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187 (2000).
53 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
("To require that § 2 liability turn on a plaintiff's ability or inability to recon-
struct the hypothetical marketplace absent a defendant's anticompetitive con-
duct would only encourage monopolists to take more and earlier
anticompetitive action."); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1945) (excluding "secondary" aluminum ingot from
defendant Alcoa's market because Alcoa had some control over how much
secondary market there could be).
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dard market-definition analysis would require that the next-best sub-
stitute (NeoProfen) be included in the relevant market."
B. Contrary fact findings, and some deeply suspicious conduct
But in any case, as we said, what was really strange in Lundbeck
was the demonstration of price competition that ran throughout the
court's findings of fact. Oddly, a number of findings just explicitly
state that the drugs are price-competitive substitutes. "When
launching NeoProfen," said the court, "an independent owner
would not have disregarded Indocin IV's price."" The court also
found that in Lundbeck's internal strategic analyses, it perceived the
two drugs to be in direct price competition." Lundbeck perceived
that, no doubt, because clinical evidence showed them to be equally
effective for their FDA-approved use 7 and because, despite the pref-
erences of some doctors and pharmacists, the general feeling in the
medical community seemed to be pretty equivocal between them."
There also was the fact that in projecting the initial price for Indocin,
before it was even aware that NeoProfen was in development,
Lundbeck took into consideration the much higher cost of surgical
treatment for PDA, and then lowered the projected price when it
learned of NeoProfen."
5 See FTC & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.11
(1992) (once hypothetical monopolist finds it unprofitable to raise prices,
next-best substitute is added to the relevant market).
5 FF 63.
56 See FF 79 (combining the two products was expected to "allow us to
cannibalize our Indocin IV sales in a controlled manner . and continue to
grow total company sales in the PDA market"); FF 80 (combination would
"allow Lundbeck to realize a more stable revenue stream for both products
within the PDA market"); FF 82 (NeoProfen introduced with a three percent
discount to Indocin IV to "take[] away potential pharmaeconomic debate");
FF 84 (reasons that some customers were not ordering NeoProfen included
price).
5 FF 21 (finding clinical evidence to show both drugs equally effective
at treating PDA).
58 See supra note 13.
5 FF 44, 45.
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The court's view that "neonatologists are the relevant consumers"'
is also dubious. Its own findings show that hospitals are price sensi-
tive and make the actual purchase decisions,"1 and that some hospitals
would be in a position to seek lower prices.62 The court of appeals
affirmed those findings in a stark, matter-of-fact summary: "Hospitals
use inclusion in the formulary to extract better prices from sellers of
clinically-substitutable drugs." 3 If only doctors' opinions mattered, it
would be hard to explain Lundbeck's outreach to nonphysician mem-
bers of hospital pharmacy and therapeutics committees." And if only
quality was relevant, it would be hard to explain its price incentives.'
It would also be hard to explain the fact that insurers and other pur-
chasers exert efforts to steer doctors toward cheaper alternative drugs
when they can." If it wouldn't work, why bother? And if it does, then
even drugs administered only in hospitals are subject to price con-
straints entitled to antitrust protection.
Likewise, on the court's findings, a range of Lundbeck's con-
duct would have been irrational unless Lundbeck itself thought the
drugs were substitutes. Antitrust usually applies a strong presump-
0 FF 113.
61 FF 88.
62 FF 93 ("Hospitals may try to control costs within their formularies.
When two or more sellers of clinically substitutable drugs vie for inclusion on
a formulary, a hospital may use its formulary system to negotiate price con-
cessions by promising or threatening to use more or less of a drug.").
63 FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 2011).
6 FF 83, 85.
65 When Lundbeck first introduced NeoProfen in 2006, it keyed NeoPro-
fen's price to the price of its existing Indocin product, minus a three percent
discount, to "allow[] [sales] rep[resentatives] to spend more time selling prod-
uct differentiation in the NICU vs. spending time with the pharmacy director
on price. . . ." FF 82. See also id. (also noting that small discount "will not con-
vert the economic driven vial splitting crowd").
66 Hovenkamp, supra note 4, at 3 n.12. Bernard draws the interesting
(though unsupported) distinction that insurers mostly do this with respect to
drugs for long-term use, and not acute care, single-use drugs like Indocin and
Neoprofen. Bernard, supra note 9. The court made no such finding, however,
and in any case there was plenty of other evidence of price sensitivity.
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tion of rationality,"7 so this should have been evidence of meaning-
ful competition.
Immediately after acquiring the two products, Lundbeck began an
effort to differentiate them on the basis of safety and side effects, an
effort comprising several million dollars invested in direct marketing
efforts.18 A strategy to "accelerate the conversion of first-line PDA
treatment from Indocin IV to [NeoProfen]" 6 would make no sense if
the products were not substitutes. For one thing, if the products were
not substitutable, a rational firm would not waste money trying to
convince consumers that they differ. If Indocin and Neoprofen really
were not substitutable, then consumers should not have needed mil-
lions of dollars' worth of convincing of it.
But more importantly, if the drugs were not substitutes, the differ-
entiation strategy would be self-defeating. Lundbeck was the owner of
two separate products, which it acquired for tens of millions of dollars.
Absent other explanation, its rational strategy would be to maximize
the profits from each of them. But on the contrary, after spending sig-
nificant sums to acquire two separate drugs to treat the same condi-
tion, within six months of one another, it then devoted itself to
disparaging one of them to its consumers.7 0 It would be peculiar
indeed for the supplier of two separate, noncompeting products to dis-
courage sales of either. In this case Lundbeck not only did that, but
apparently sought to kill off demand for one of them altogether.
67 That was the law in the Eighth Circuit, e.g., FTC v. Tenet Health Care
Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1054 (8th Cir. 1999) (a finding of behavior "contrary to
[the actor's] economic interests . is suspect"), and elsewhere, because
"antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evi-
dence," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
588 (1986) (holding that where evidence of antitrust defendant's conduct is
ambiguous, courts presumptively construe it in way most consistent with
rational behavior).
68 Lundbeck established a massive, direct-sales marketing effort involv-
ing dozens of its own sales personnel and scores more from Abbott Laborato-
ries (for which Lundbeck paid $2 million) to convince customers of
NeoProfen's superiority. FF 34, 81-87.
69 FF at 80.
70 FF 81.
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By contrast, all of this behavior is nicely explained under the sim-
ple alternate story that we already laid out above. The differentiation
strategy makes sense if the products in fact were good substitutes,
because Indocin would shortly face serious challenge from a generic
substitute." It was therefore crucial to Lundbeck to differentiate them
in order to protect NeoProfen's intellectual property-protected profit
potential from the generic competition that would overtake Indocin.72
As the court itself found, Lundbeck sought to convert Indocin users to
NeoProfen because it expected generic competition to Indocin, which
would take more sales away from Indocin than from NeoProfen.7
Along these lines, one concluding statement in the Lundbeck opin-
ion, apparently meant as sort of a Q.E.D. moment, actually captured
just how poorly the court understood what happened in this case:
"Were NeoProfen and Indocin IV in the same product market, Lund-
beck's attempt to persuade neonatologists to switch from Indocin IV
to NeoProfen would not make sense."'
On the contrary, it is the only thing that makes sense.
In any case, other firms in the sector also thought the drugs were
substitutes. The court found that, though Lundbeck always intended
to increase the price of Indocin after its acquisition, it deliberately
chose not to do so until after it had completed negotiations with
Abbott Laboratories for the acquisition of NeoProfen: "Lundbeck was
concerned that Abbott Laboratories would demand a higher price for
the rights to NeoProfen if the announcement of Indocin IV's price
increase took place before Lundbeck's acquisition of the rights to Neo-
Profen.""7 But why would Abbott do any such thing if the two prod-
ucts were not price competitors? Likewise, while Abbott wanted to
introduce NeoProfen at a much higher price than Indocin,7 that plan
71 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
7 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
73 FF 64.
7 FF 116.
7 FF 58.
76 FF 61.
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depended on FDA approval of a label stating NeoProfen's superiority
to it. When the agency rejected the label,' Abbott gave up and sold the
drug to the one firm that could price both of them without fear of com-
petition. Moreover, even when Abbott was planning that higher price,
it projected only $450 to $500 per treatment, because at that time
Merck still owned Indocin and was selling it for less than $80.8
IV. A FEW FINAL THOUGHTS ON TYPE I VS. TYPE II
BALANCE, OR, I MEAN, SERIOUSLY GUYS, COME ON
But finally, none of the foregoing is really as important to us as
one much more general point of policy. Some writers on Lundbeck
appear intent on trying to support the court's holding by emphasiz-
ing certain facts79 or abstruse theoretical possibilities," but in doing so
they beg a very big question. There is a reason that we do not always
force plaintiffs' into complex and expensive fact litigation or make
them overcome every conceivably plausible defense theory. We do in
fact care about false negative risk, even though this somehow came to
be dwarfed by fear of false positives (despite the lack of empirical evi-
dence one way or the other"). We also care about the message that is
sent by excessive cost or complexity hurdles to enforcement. Clear
" FF 16, 36, 61.
78 FF 61.
7 For example, Bernard, supra note 9, is mostly devoted to identifying
drug industry facts purportedly rendering price competition unlikely (con-
trary to much of the evidence and the trial court's findings).
80 Werden, supra note 9, defends the Lundbeck result by postulating a
model showing that "competition can produce monopoly pricing." Id. at 93.
Dr. Werden assumes rather a big can opener, by taking all the court's fact
finding as true, including the finding that there is little cross price-elasticity;
he then asks if the market would be competitive. It is possibly not so earth
shattering that if your model assumes no price competition, then it will pre-
dict that there won't be any price competition. Nonetheless, Werden does not
suggest that the two drugs are in different product markets.
81 See generally John E. Kwoka, Jr., The Attack on Antitrust Policy and Con-
suiner Welfare: A Response to Crandall and Winston 2-3 (Northeastern Univ.
Dep't of Econ. Working Paper 03-008, June 2003) (noting absence of empirical
evidence on the effects of enforcement error).
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rules aid private ordering," but more importantly signal to business
that antisocial risks aren't worth taking. Had the Commission won in
Lundbeck, for example, we might not have had to deal with that other
pending drug acquisition mentioned above, which has resulted in a
56,000% price increase."
For these reasons, antitrust deliberately generalizes a simple set of
rules across most markets, and limits the kinds of arguments one can
make to avoid them (or at least it used to), but not because anyone
really knows for sure how well price theory accurately captures most
markets. This sort of thing shouldn't be surprising to anyone in the
drug sector or elsewhere, because the Supreme Court has been saying it
for decades. For example, you can't say you need trade-restraining pro-
fessional association rules to prevent unsafe workmanship, because:
[t]he assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources
in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality, service,
safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably
affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.'
For the same reason, you can't argue that your market-restraining
conduct is needed to conserve natural resources," or to address insta-
bility or overcapacity,6 or to prevent any other sort of "ruinous" or
"destructive" competition.' It is for these reasons that, in the merger con-
82 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) ("unless
businessmen can assess the legal consequences of a merger with some confi-
dence, sound business planning is retarded.").
8 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
8 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
85 Cf United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 170 (1940)
(noting evidence that vigorous competition might cause some oil wells to be
abandoned and the oil within thent-to be lost, but finding price-fixing con-
spiracy illegal nonetheless).
86 Cf. id. at 171-72 (discussing conditions of acute overcapacity, which
also were held legally irrelevant).
87 See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 338 & n.7
(1990)("a firm cannot claim antitrust injury from nonpredatory price competi-
tion on the asserted ground that it is 'ruinous' " (citing United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-12 (1972))); Phila. Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. at 371
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text, antitrust is supposed to contain an "incipiency" presumption,"
and why we usually see a rule of effectively per se illegality for
monopoly-preserving mergers." The whole purpose of these rules is
to free enforcement from abstruse, opaque theoretical fantasies and
expensive factual litigation."o
And so our question about Lundbeck, in the end, is not whether
there is some plausible scenario in which the challenged conduct does
not make a bad competitive situation worse. The question is, so what?
Why shouldn't a monopolist's acquisition of its next closest competitor
promising literally no social benefit, and which can be identified as
such relatively easily, be illegal?
(conduct challenged in antitrust "is not saved because, on some ultimate reck-
oning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A
value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial com-
petence, and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress when it
enacted [the antitrust laws]."); Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222 ("Whatever
may be its peculiar problems and characteristics, the Sherman Act, so far as
price-fixing agreements are concerned, establishes one uniform rule applica-
ble to all industries alike.").
8 Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362 (Clayton Act section 7 "was intended
to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their 'incipiency.' ").
8 See supra note 5.
90 See, e.g., Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of
Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960); Herbert Hovenkamp, Derek
Bok and the Merger of Law and Economics, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 515 (1988).
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